The Geography of Deterrence
The Swiss National Reduit (Réduit) is a political and military strategy of deterrence based entirely on geography. The concept, which originated in the 1880s, was fully articulated on July 25, 1940, by General Henri Guisan. Facing complete encirclement by Axis powers after the fall of France, Guisan gathered the Swiss officer corps on the historic Rütli meadow and outlined a stark plan: if invaded, the army would not defend the entire border. Instead, it would execute an orderly retreat from the populated, industrial lowlands into a pre-fortified, self-sufficient zone deep within the Alps, centered on the St. Gotthard, St. Maurice, and Sargans mountain passes.
This strategy conceded about 80% of the population to an invader, a controversial decision intended to preserve the state itself. The Reduit was intended to make an occupation of Switzerland a strategic nightmare. By controlling the important north-south alpine tunnels and passes, a relatively small Swiss force could deny this infrastructure to an enemy and inflict disproportionate casualties. The plan called for up to eight infantry divisions and three mountain brigades to man the Reduit. This force of nearly 300,000 soldiers would be sustained by vast, pre-stocked underground supply depots, hospitals, and bakeries, and command centers, some designed to support hundreds of soldiers for months. Every bridge and tunnel leading into the Reduit was rigged with over 3,000 demolition points, ready to be destroyed to halt an enemy advance.